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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an explanation for the observed positive relationship between 
youth unemployment and the cost of firing workers. When the cost of firing workers 
is high, firms only fire when the present discounted value of future losses is high, in 
which case they gain little by postponing the firing decision in the hope that 
productivity will recover. The young workers are then the first to go due to their 
longer remaining tenure. In contrast, when the cost of firing workers is low, the 
present discounted value of future losses is small at the firing margin and firms may 
choose to wait in the hope of a recovery. In this case they may choose to fire the older 
workers first since the younger ones are more likely to be around when productivity 
recovers.  
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Firms have the option of choosing when to fire workers during economic downturns. 
This option has implications for the composition of the pool of workers fired. In 
particular, we will show how the interplay of uncertainty about future productivity 
and the level of firing costs affects the age composition of the pool of fired workers. 
Our intuition is simple: in a perfect-foresight framework, management may decide to 
fire its younger workers in a downturn if it does not expect profits to recover – 
because the present discounted value of future losses from employing them exceeds 
that for the older workers due to longer expected tenure – while with uncertainty 
about future productivity and profits, management may decide to wait before firing 
the young workers, the more so the greater is the uncertainty. We call the first case 
the “tenure effect” and the second the “sacrificed options effect”. We will show how 
the level of firing costs determines their relative size; in particular how high firing 
costs can make the tenure effect dominate the sacrificed options effect and firms 
respond to a downturn by firing the younger workers. 
 The decision by firms to fire workers is essentially an irreversible investment 
decision under uncertainty, whose timing can be chosen by management. Severance 
payments to labour are one obvious reason why the firing decision is most accurately 
modelled as an investment decision. There are also implicit costs of firing workers in 
the absence of such laws. For example, firing decisions may disrupt production, have 
negative morale effects or shorten the expected future tenure of remaining workers. A 
simple way of modelling the firing decision is to compare the present discounted 
value of future losses from employing a worker with the cost of firing him – a Tobin-
q theory of dismissals. This insight gives a tenure effect so that firms gain more – in 
terms of lowering expected discounted losses – from firing young workers with long 
remaining tenure. But it has been observed that firms only fire workers when the 
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expected savings from doing so far exceed the cost, which indicates that they take into 
account the possibility that profits may recover and that they will live to regret the 
firing decision. This observation is captured by Okun’s law. Our intuition is simple: 
with low firing costs the option to fire a worker is valueable and the firm may hesitate 
to fire a given worker because productivity and profits may improve in the future. The 
effect will be to protect the employment of young workers – who have long expected 
job tenure – at the expense of older workers. Thus the sacrificed option effect is 
greater for the younger workers because it is more likely that productivity will recover 
during their tenure. In contrast, older workers may be fired because it is less likely 
that a recovery may lead the firm management to regret such a decision in light of 
their short remaining tenure. However, when the level of the firing costs goes up this 
option becomes less valuable and the employment of the younger workers is 
threatened. In sum, while the tenure effect dominates at high firing costs the sacrificed 
option effect dominates at low firing costs.  
 Intuitively, at the firing margin, the present discounted value of future losses from 
an employed worker is greater the higher are firing costs, making the firm prefer to 
fire workers with longer expected tenure. The tenure effect dominates the sacrificed 
option effect. But when the firing costs are low, the expected discounted losses are 
small at the firing margin, and a small recovery of productivity may turn losses into 
profits and the sacrificed option effect becomes stronger. This is more likely to 
happen in the case of a young worker.  
 When considering the hiring decision, in spite of the marginal benefit of hiring 
young workers falling with the level of firing costs, firms prefer to hire the younger 
workers first for all vales of firing costs because they have longer expected tenure and 
also, and for the same reason, a larger firing option than the older workers. Therefore, 
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our analysis has the empirical implication of a positive relationship between the 
relative unemployment of young workers and the level of firing costs when wages are 
treated as exogenous.1  
 Our model complements that of Lazear and Freeman (1997) who find that during 
a downturn the youngest and the oldest workers should be the first to go because the 
young have not been given any firm-specific skills while the productivity of older 
workers has declined relative to their wages. While this can explain high youth 
unemployment during recessions, it does not predict a positive relationship between 
the level of firing costs and youth unemployment. 
 A number of studies have attempted to estimate the extent to which the poor 
performance of European countries can be explained by formal employment-
protection legislation. Lazear (1990) uses a sample of 22 OECD countries over the 
period 1956 and 1984 and finds that severance-pay requirements reduce 
employment.2 Our model has the empirical prediction of a positive relationship 
between relative youth unemployment and the level of firing costs. These empirical 
predictions are supported by a number of papers. While Blanchard (2006) emphasises 
the magnitude of the youth unemployment problem in Europe, Bertola et al. (2002) 
find that high unemployment for the younger age groups is particularly pronounced in 
the more unionised countries as well as in those having more stringent employment 
protection legislation. Such a relationship has also been found by Scarpetta (1996) 
and Jimeno and Rodriguez- Palenzuela (2003). Scarpetta (1996) estimates 
                                                 
1 In a model with endogenous wages, there is of course the possibility of wages adjusting to ensure 
indifference. However, it is clear that firms are not indifferent as to the age composition of the staff they 
choose to fire. Clearly, there are other effects on wage setting; such as the promise of rising wage profiles 
intended to spur effort, which has been used to explain mandatory retirement (Lazear, 1979), as well as firms 
using tournaments to increase effort (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) or unions having preferences about the 
relative wages of different age groups. 
2 See also Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell (1998), DiTella and 
MacCulloch (1998) and Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005).  
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unemployment equations for OECD countries for the period 1983-1993 for both the 
total unemployment rate as well as the youth unemployment rate, the long-term 
unemployment rate and the non-employment rate. He finds support for the earlier 
result of Lazear that stringent employment protection contributes to high 
unemployment and non-employment rates. Moreover, his results suggest that 
employment protection raises youth and long-term unemployment. In addition, young 
workers are adversely affected by strong unions who may set wages above their 
market-clearing level. Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2003) use a panel data set 
for OECD countries in the period 1960 to 1996 to measure the effect of 
macroeconomic shocks, labour market institutions and demographic development to 
explain the relative youth unemployment rate. The macroeconomic factors considered 
include labour demand shifts, real interest rates and total factor productivity growth 
while labour market institutions include unemployment benefit systems, a measure of 
active labour market policies, wage determination, the tax wedge, employment 
protection, minimum wages and an indicator of the strictness of the legislation 
regarding the use of temporary contracts. The results show that the youth 
unemployment differential (defined as the difference in the rate of unemployment 
between the 15-25 age group and the 25-54 age group) increases with the strictness of 
employment protection and the strictness of regulation affecting temporary 
employment – meaning the ease by which workers get fixed-term contracts – in 
addition to union density, the tax wedge and decreases in coordination. Thus the 
youth unemployment differential is again shown to be an increasing function of the 
strictness of the employment protection legislation.  
 Our model belongs to a body of research that uses real options to describe the 
effect of different macroeconomic variables, such as real interest rates and expected 
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productivity growth rates, on the firing decision (see Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).3 
Our contribution is to model the firing decision by allowing for worker heterogeneity 
in terms of age.  
 
1. An option-valuation approach  
The option-valuation approach to investment has been popular since the seminal 
papers of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) on the pricing of stock 
options. These methods of valuing stocks can be easily applied to real options, which 
denote the option-like characteristics of investment opportunities. The decision to 
invest (or the decision to exercise real options) becomes important with the existence 
of uncertainty and sunk costs. McDonald and Siegel (1986) show that the required 
rate of return on investment in many large industrial projects can be more than 
doubled by moderate amounts of uncertainty when the investment project is at least 
partly irreversible.4  
 In most cases it is assumed that the real options are infinitely lived – the real-life 
investment opportunities are infinitely lived and never valueless (e.g. McDonald and 
Siegel; 1984, 1986). However, some research deals with the non-perpetual real 
options (e.g. Paddock, Siegel and Smith, 1988). However, it has been claimed that it 
is often not possible to solve such non-perpetual options analytically, making 
numerical methods essential.5 Generally speaking, it is hard to solve for free-
                                                 
3 In another paper (Chen and Zoega, 1999) we have shown how the employment effects of 
employment protection depend on the nature of the stochastic process followed by productivity – trend 
growth, variance, and degree of mean reversion – in addition to the real rate of interest and workers’ 
quit rates.  
4 For an introduction, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
5 One of the reasons for the non-existence of analytical solutions is that such options are similar to 
American stock options that can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date. It is well-known 
that American stock options can only be solved for using analytical approximations or numerical 
methods such as finite-difference methods. American call options with lump-sum dividends are an 
exception though in that their terminal and boundary conditions differ (see Roll, 1977; Geske, 1979; 
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boundary time-dependent real options. This is partly due to functions of time-
dependent options having a complicated shape, which may require several analytical 
functions for simulation. We will show in the case of real options that approximate 
analytical solutions do exist.6 The approximate solutions of non-perpetual real options 
should share the same composite components as perpetual real options. The partial 
differential equation of non-perpetual real options can then be transformed into a 
convection-diffusion problem,7 which can be solved for analytically using partial 
differential equations. 
 
2. Modelling the firing decision 
There is only one sector in our economy that uses labour as an input to produce a 
homogenous good. Since our focus is on labour demand, real wages are assumed to be 
fixed and their determination is not described. The source of uncertainty is stochastic 
productivity. Current profits, measured in units of output, are defined as follows,  
( ) ,, ttttt wNNgNg −=Π θ           0<θ <1,                           (1) 
where N denotes the number of employed workers, w is the real wage, and g is a 
measure of productivity. It is assumed that each worker has a maximum working life 
of T at time zero (t=0). Some workers will however end up working less time because 
they either choose to quit or are fired before reaching this age. To simplify the model, 
we assume that all workers have the same productivity and wage independent of their 
                                                                                                                                            
Whaley, 1981). The possible analytical solutions to partial differential equations vary greatly when 
boundary- and terminal (and/or initial) conditions change. Changes in such conditions can result in the 
non-existence of analytical solutions. The method used here is most similar to Barone-Adesi and 
Whaley (1987).  
6 ‘Approximate’ in the sense that the solutions might not be complete but still a good proxy for real 
solutions. We show in Appendix D the difference between the approximiate solutions and numerical 
solutions by the finite difference method.  
7 In physics, convection is the movement of the substance by the movement of the medium. Combined 
with a diffusion problem, it will be like the diffusion of a moving wave. 
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age. Later we make wages depend on age in order to take into account the possibility 
that workers may become more expensive as they age, as in Lazear (1979). 
 It is assumed that g follows a geometric Brownian motion 
ssss dWgdsgdg ση += ,                                              (2) 
where  is a standard Wiener process; sW dsdW ss ε=  and sε  is a serially 
uncorrelated, normally distributed random variable with mean zero and a standard 
deviation of unity. Here η  is the drift parameter (the expected growth rate of labour 
productivity) and σ  the variance parameter. We initially assume that this average quit 
rate per unit time is constant over time and equal to λ  and later make it age 
dependent. The probability that a given worker will quit over the interval ds  is 
therefore equal to dsλ .  
 The firm’s expected marginal value of an employee without any firing and/or 
hiring is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=≡ ∫ −+−
T
t
ts
st dsewYETtYvTtYv
λρ;,;, ,                           (3) 
where E[·] denotes the expectation operator given the information set available to the 
firm at time t, ρ  denotes the real interest rate, v is the (intertemporal) marginal value 
of workers, Y g  represents the marginal product of labour at time s, and 
 denotes instantaneous marginal profits at time s. Equation (3) is similar to the 
expressions in Bentolila and Bertola (1990) except each marginal worker can only 
work for the firm for a maximum interval of (T – t). Note that (T – t) is the maximum 
possible tenure since workers might quit or get fired earlier.  Lemma gives the 
following process for marginal productivity, 
Ns s s= −θ θ 1
wYs −
s'oˆIt
YdWYdsdY Y ση += ,                                             (4) 
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where ( )θληη −+= 1Y . 
 Now consider the effect of the firing and hiring costs on firms’ profits decisions. 
When the expected marginal value of an employee is greater than the hiring cost, the 
firm starts to hire new workers; when the negative of the expected marginal value of 
an employee is higher than the firing cost, the firm starts to fire workers. Thus, the 
process of  or sY ( )tYv ,  becomes an optional stopping problem or regulated Itô 
process. The firm will hire a marginal worker if  
( ), ;v Y t T H≥                                                    (5.1) 
and fire a marginal worker if  
( ), ;v Y t T F− ≥ ,                                                  (5.2) 
where H and F represent hiring and firing costs respectively.  
A standard technique for solving the above dynamic optimisation problem is 
Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1957). Using  Lemma, we get the 
following Bellman equation for the marginal value of the firm’s stock of workers; 
, in the continuation region where the values of future hires and fires are 
not taken into account, 
s'oˆIt
( TtYvv ;,≡ )
( ) tYYYY vvYYvwYv +++−=+ 222
1 σηλρ .                              (6) 
Equation (6) relates the value of the marginal workers to the value of the stochastic 
variable Y at each point in time. The partial term with respect to time, vt, in equation 
(6) makes the differential equation difficult to solve. A simple way to get around this 
without resorting to pure numerical methods would be to assume that the analytical 
solutions have the same components as the infinitely-lived case found in Bentolila 
and Bertola (1990). In this case, equation (6) becomes a second-order ordinary 
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differential equation in Y and as a result the option values of hiring and firing workers 
become independent of time. It follows that the options for hires and/or fires do not 
approach zero when workers age. In this paper we will correct for this and show how 
interesting implications arise. 
 The problem now is to solve for v, which is the value of employing a marginal 
worker. The solution for v consists of the particular integral and the general function. 
A convenient particular solution, , for (6) can be obtained by integrating (3) directly Pv
,bwaYv P −=                                                     (7) 
where ( )( )( ) ( )YtTYea ηλρηλρ −+−= −−+−1 , ( )( )( ) ( )λρλρ +−= −+− tTeb 1  and it is assumed 
that the denominator of the parameter a is positive. As T approaches infinity, the 
particular solution becomes identical to the one in the perpetual setup. The smaller 
value of T yields smaller value of particular solutions, which echoes the intuition that 
old workers have a lower value for the firm. 
 The firm takes into account the option value of hiring in the future. There is also 
the option to fire the worker once he is employed. The two option values are 
measured by the general (or homogenous) solutions to equation (6). Now only 
focusing on the homogenous part of (6) and letting v  be the value of the marginal 
option, we get 
G
( ) GtGYYGYYG vvYYvv ++=+ 222
1σηλρ .                                    (8) 
The general solutions of (8) are equal to the value of the options to hire or fire the 
marginal worker. When Y approaches zero, the value of the option to hire, , has to 
go to zero. Similarly, the firing option, , is equal to zero when Y goes to infinity. 
Thus, the general solutions for the hiring and firing options have to satisfy the 
following boundary conditions respectively, 
G
Hv
G
Fv
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( ) 0;,lim
0
=→ TtYv
G
Y
 for the hiring option,                               (9.1) 
( ) 0;,lim =∞→ TtYvGY  for the firing option.                               (9.2) 
A special case of equation (8) is when workers live forever (T=∞). Thus, the term  
in equation (8) disappears and the values of the hiring- and firing options are (see 
Appendix A) 
G
tv
1
1
βYAvH =  for hiring option,                                    (10.1) 
2
2
βYAvF =  for firing option.                                    (10.2) 
The unknown parameters of  and  are determined by the value-matching and 
smooth-pasting conditions and β is determined by equation (11).  
1A 2A
( ) ( ) 01
2
1 2 =+−+− λρβηββσ Y ,                                    (11) 
where 1β  and 2β  are positive and negative roots of the above equation respectively. 
The general solutions to (8) are then given by the following equations (see Appendix 
B): 
( ) ( )11 1;, dNYATtYvGH β= ,                                        (12.1) 
( ) ( )22 2;, dNYATtYvGF −= β ,                                      (12.2) 
where A1 , A2 are unknown parameters, 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−±
= σ
σ
λρ
σ
ησ 2
2
2
2
21
2
2
1ln
, 
and ( ) ( ) ,21 22∫ ∞− −= d dedN ϖπ ϖ  ( ) 10 ≤≤ dN , is the cumulative normal distribution 
function. The general solutions, or the real options to hire/fire, have the components 
similar to the ones of financial options such as in Black and Scholes (1973) while 
keeping its perpetual parts components. Such functional forms of general solutions 
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make it possible to use the general solutions to solve the optimal stopping problem of 
hiring and firing. 
 Looking at the hiring- and firing options we find two separate cases: 
Case 1: T → ∞ 
It is easy to show that as T approaches infinity (workers live forever), the cumulative 
distribution functions of  and ( )1dN ( )2dN −  become unity. This reduces the firing- 
and hiring options to the case of perpetual options. 
Case 2: T → t 
If >0, then Yln ( )1dN =1 and ( 2dN )− =0 as T approaches t. If the marginal 
profitability is high enough, firms mainly focus on the hiring decision. The firing 
option approaches zero because these workers will retire very soon. 
 If Yln <0, then =0 and ( )1dN ( )2dN − =1 as T approaches zero. A small  
means that Y needs to be very small to reach the firing threshold. If the marginal 
profitability is low, firms mainly consider the firing decision. 
( )tT −
 The decision as to hire or fire workers depends on his value as given by the 
equations giving particular solutions and homogenous solutions: (7), (12.1), and 
(12.2). The definition of the firing- and hiring barriers; YF and YH, are then given by 
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:  
 
Value-matching conditions 
( ) ( )2 1, ; , , ; ,G GH F H H HaY bw v Y t T A H v Y t T A− + = + ,                    (13) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2, ; , , ; ,G GF H F F FaY bw v Y t T A F v Y t T A− − + = + .                  (14) 
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The left-hand side of (13) has the marginal benefit of hiring which includes the 
acquired firing option. The right-hand side has the marginal cost of hiring, which 
includes the sacrificed hiring option. Similarly for equation (14), the left-hand side 
has the marginal benefit and the right-hand side the marginal cost of firing. In our 
numerical solutions below – apart from Figure 1 of the general case of hiring and 
firing – we will only include the sacrificed firing option as part of the cost of firing; 
we will not include the acquired hiring option as a benefit of firing. In this case, we do 
not consider the hiring decision so that once an employee gets fired, the firm never 
hires this employee back – the value of the hiring option is set equal to zero. The 
reason for doing this is that firing workers is not going to alter a firm’s chances of 
filling a vacancy in the future if there are many (homogeneous) unemployed people 
(of each age) to start with.  
There are four unknown variables, YH, YF, A1, and A2, in equations (13) and (14). 
The smooth-pasting conditions follow to ensure the slopes before and after thresholds 
with respect to YH and YF are the same: 
 
Smooth-pasting conditions 
( ) ( )2, ; , , ; , 0G GF H H H
H H
v Y t T A v Y t T A
a
Y Y
∂ ∂+ −∂ ∂
1 = ,                         (15) 
( ) ( )2, ; , , ; , 0G GF F H F
F F
v Y t T A v Y t T A
a
Y Y
∂ ∂+ −∂ ∂
1 = ,                        (16) 
 
where details of derivations of various YvG ∂∂ are shown in Appendix C. 
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 Equations (13), (14), (15) and (16) are a non-linear systematic equations with four 
unknown parameters [ ] and can be solved for numerically, once 
beta roots, 
21  and , , , AAYY FH
1β  and 2β , are obtained from equation (11).  
   
3. Hiring and firing  
We will now calculate the firing thresholds on the basis of equations (13), (14), (15) 
and (16). We calculate the hiring and the firing thresholds for a fixed level of firing 
costs in the two-threshold case when both the hiring- and the firing thresholds are 
calculated simultaneously. We can show the effect of firing costs on hiring and firing 
by plotting firing thresholds against firing costs. This is shown in Figure 1 below.8 
We assume that workers enter the labour market at age 20 and retire at age 65 – it 
follows that a worker with T-t =25, that is someone with 25 years of working life 
remaining, is currently 40 years of age. 
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Figure 1.The effect of age on the hiring- and firing thresholds with different effective firing 
costs. Age is equal to (65–T). Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, 
w=1, H = 0.083, and t=0. 
 
                                                 
8 In Appendix D, we discuss the difference between the approximate solutions and pure numerical 
solutions by the standard explicit finite difference method. The results, if anything, show that the real 
thresholds of firing are greater than the ones of the approximate solutions for the old. This shows that 
the results of the paper hold. 
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As the effective firing costs rise, the firm becomes more inclined to fire the younger 
among its workers. The reason is that part of the cost of firing workers is the 
sacrificed option of doing so in the future. This was shown in equation (14). This 
firing option is decreasing in both the level of the firing costs and in the worker’s age. 
For low levels of firing costs, the marginal cost of firing the young workers is higher 
than the cost of firing older ones for this reason. But at high firing costs, the 
difference is much smaller as the firing option is always very low – both for the young 
and the old workers. However, the marginal benefit of firing the young workers is 
always higher – that is for all levels of firing costs – because of their longer remaining 
tenure. We conclude that the firm would choose to fire the young workers first if 
firing costs were high – the value of the firing option low – but at low firing costs it 
may choose to fire the older workers first since the marginal cost of doing so is much 
lower. Furthermore, we find that firms always hire younger workers first no matter 
what level the firing costs are. 
 We can explain the effect of F on firing options in more details in the following 
simplified case. Consider the firing-only scenario with perpetual workers, the value-
matching and smooth conditions are as follows 
( ) 22 βFF YAFbwaY +=−− ,                                        (17) 
1
22
2 −= ββ FYAa ,                                                 (18) 
where  represents the perpetual firing option as shown in (10.2). Equation (18) 
shows that the value of the option to fire is a linear function of Y: 
2
2
β
FYA
2
22
ββ FYAaY = . 
Thus, if the firing threshold Y falls due to a direct increase of F, the option to fire 
would also decrease accordingly. Though the fall of the Y thresholds due to an 
increase in F leads to higher value of , the parameter  ensures that the whole 2βFY 2A
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firing option falls as F increases. The firing option measures the waiting values from 
postponing exercising the option to fire workers. As the direct costs of firing F 
increase, the probability that Y will return to a profitable value for the firm after the 
firing decision is made becomes smaller. Intuitively, at the firing margin, the present 
discounted value of future profits from an employed worker is more negative the 
higher are firing costs, making the firm prefer to fire workers with longer expected 
tenure. The tenure effect dominates the sacrificed option effect. But when the firing 
costs are low, the expected discounted losses are small at the firing margin, and a 
small recovery of productivity may turn losses into profits, the sacrificed option effect 
becomes stronger. This is more likely to happen in the case of a young worker. 
Therefore, for a high value of F, the firm would not regret its decisions to fire, which 
implies that the value of waiting, that is the firing option, is less important to the firm. 
This relationship still holds numerically for workers who do not live forever and for 
the system of the general hiring/firing value-matching conditions of equations (13) 
and (14). 
 In this sense, the difference between the option of firing a young and an old worker 
becomes negligible for high F. This implies that with high firing costs, the firm tends 
to fire the young workers first in order to reduce its losses for a much longer period of 
time than when the older workers are fired. However with low firing costs, the firm 
values the option to be able to fire the workers at a later date when more information 
about the evolution of productivity is available. This option is worth more in the case 
of the young workers and hence the firm faces higher costs of firing the younger 
workers on this account. As a consequence, the firm tends to fire the older ones first 
when the cost of firing is low. 
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 Note the difference between our setup and that of Lazear and Freeman (1997). 
They claim that it is optimal to fire the younger workers because they are less 
productive since the (firm-specific) skill accumulation has not been completed. We 
find that they should also – if there are significant costs of firing – be the first to go 
even if their productivity is no lower than that of older workers. Firing a young 
worker is more profitable than firing an older worker since his/her expected tenure is 
longer. Note also, that these results do not depend on firing costs rising over tenure. 
All that is needed is a high and constant level of firing costs.  
  
4. Macroeconomic implications 
We have found that high firing costs provide more protection to the older workers 
than to the younger ones. It follows that the age structure of the population affects the 
tightness of employment-protection legislation; the ageing of the workforce has the 
same effect on the firing thresholds as an increase in the firing costs themselves. This 
has two implications.  
First, when assessing the nature of a country’s labour-market institutions one has 
to normalise for the age structure of the labour force. Two countries with similar 
legislation can nevertheless have different effective legislation in the sense that firms 
are more reluctant to fire workers in one of the countries. Second, changes in the age 
structure of the population over time may have important consequences. To take an 
example, the employment-protection legislation already in place in France, Italy and 
Spain may have been less restrictive in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s and 
1990s due to the aging of the baby boom generation.  
Figure 2 shows the interaction between the level of firing costs, on the one hand, 
and the age of workers, on the other hand, in determining the level of productivity at 
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which firms start firing each worker. With low firing costs, the firing threshold is 
monotonically rising in age making the more mature workers be the first to lose their 
jobs in a downturn. But as the level of firing costs rises and, the sign of this 
relationship changes and the threshold becomes monotonically falling in age making 
the young workers the first to go if labour demand falls.9
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Figure 2.The effect of age on the firing threshold with different firing costs. Age is equal to 
(65–T). Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0. 
 
 
Figure 3 below shows the firing thresholds for both young (age 20) and old (age 60) 
workers who both will retire at age 65. The figure shows clearly that we fire old 
workers first with low F and then tend to fire the younger ones as F becomes high, as 
discussed in the previous section. The thresholds cross where F roughly equals one 
month’s wages, that is F=1. 
                                                 
9 Note that the numerical results in Figures 2, 3, and 4 are obtained by running the value-
matching/smooth-pasting conditions for firing thresholds only, with the assumption of null hiring 
options and no hiring decisions. As shown in Chen and Zoega (1999), this simplification does not 
affect the qualitative results for firing thresholds when only discussing the effect of F. 
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Figure 3.The effect of firing costs on the firing threshold for two age groups. Other   
parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0. 
 
5. Pensions and quits 
Other reasons for age discrimination in firing involve the direct and indirect effects of 
pension schemes. Most pension schemes are defined-benefit schemes, making 
benefits increase more rapidly as the age of retirement approaches. This makes 
employers want to lay off workers with a long tenure.10 However, an extension of our 
model also predicts that firms may not fire the older workers but for a different 
reason: When the age of retirement approaches, the older workers have more to gain 
from quitting and as their quit rates rise, firms benefit more in present discounted 
value terms from firing the younger workers.  
 We now augment the model by taking into account the observation that the old 
are more likely to quit because of the higher pension benefits they can expect to 
collect in retirement. In particular, we assume that benefits increase more rapidly as 
the age of retirement approaches. This is described by the following quadratic 
function: 
( )( )2450001.005.0 tT −−+=λ                                       (19) 
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This implies that a person of age 20 has a quit rate 0.05, and a person of age 65 has a 
quite rate 0.22. The effect of introducing this quit rate function11 is shown in the 
following diagram: 
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Figure 4.The effect of age on the firing thresholds with different effective firing costs (firing-
only scenario). Ages are equal to (65–T). Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, 
w=1, H = 0.083, t=0 and λ=0.05+0.0001(45-(T-t))2. The bolder lines show the case of 
constant quit rates. 
 
There are two forces at work. As workers become older the present discounted value 
of future profits (losses) from employing them will fall not just because they have less 
time left but because they are more likely to quit. This shows up in the value of the 
particular integral falling with age. The effect is to lower the firing threshold, 
productivity has to fall to an even lower level than before in the case of the older 
workers for the firm to want to fire them. Another effect is to lower the value of the 
firing options, which results in a higher firing threshold. For low levels of firing costs, 
for example F =0.2, those two effects almost cancel each other out. For higher firing 
                                                                                                                                            
10 A possible offsetting effect can be found in Orszag et al. (1999) who show that old workers may 
behave differently, in particular exert more effort because they have more to lose in the event of a 
dismissal. 
11 We only consider a firing threshold setup only here.  The omittance of hiring thresholds means that 
there are no hiring option when it comes to the firing decisions. As hiring options have a smaller 
indirect effect on firing thresholds than fixed hiring costs, compared with the greater value of firing 
options, the firing threshold only setup will display similar qualitative results except for the downward 
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costs, the importance of the firing options fades away as discussed in the previous 
sections. Therefore, the effect on the particular integrals dominates and leads to lower 
firing thresholds. Thus, the effect of a pension scheme on quitting will reinforce the 
preference for firing the young workers when the cost of firing is high: Pensions for 
the old cause job insecurity for the young. Intuitively, firing the young increases the 
value of the firm by more than firing the old – it is a better investment – because it is 
less likely that they would have left the firm on their own accord.  
 
6. Rising wages and firing costs 
In this section we consider the implications of having wages and firing costs rise with 
age. Rising wages have been used to justify firms choosing to fire older workers 
during downturns (Lazear and Freeman, 1997) and also mandatory retirement (see 
Lazear, 1979), the idea being that while a rising age profile induces workers to stay 
with their current employer and avoid shirking, there comes a time at which the older 
workers have become expensive for the firm – wages high relative to productivity – 
and they can then expect either to be fired to forced into retirement. In Figure 4 we let 
wages be rising linearly in age so that w = 1+0.002(age – 20). Note that age=20 gives 
a wage of 1 and an age of 65 gives a wage of 1.09. This implies that a 65 year old 
worker is 9% more costly for a given level of productivity – her/his unit labour costs 
are 9% higher – than a worker of age 20.  
                                                                                                                                            
shifting of the firing thresholds. A comparisons of the left-hand side of Figure 1 with Figure 4 show 
this to be the case. 
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Figure 5.The effect of age on the firing thresholds with different firing costs and linear wage 
function (firing-only scenario). Ages are equal to (65–T). Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, 
θ=0.7, η=0.02, w=1, H = 0.083, and t=0. The bolder lines show the case of constant wages. 
 
The figure shows that when wages rise with age, the previous results hold but it takes 
a higher level of firing costs to make the firm choose to fire the younger workers since 
the older workers are now more costly to employ. Numerical simulations show that 
with F=5 or more, the firm will fire the younger workers first, although the 
differences are small among young workers. 
 In the second figure we let firing costs F be rising in workers’ age using a logistic 
function.12 A logistic function is used: 
((
1.30.2
1 exp 0.5 30
F
age
= + + − ⋅ − .                                      (20) 
According to the function, F = 0.2 when the worker is young and F =0 .2+1.3 = 1.5 
when he is old, the central/reflective point being around age=30 years, and the 
transitional speed from F=0.2 to F=1.5 is controlled by the parameter "0.5", the 
bigger the transitional speed parameter, the faster it is transiting from 0.2 to 1.5. The 
firing cost is barely changed after age=38 for employees as shown in the figure below.  
                                                 
12 Appendix E has figures when firing costs rise linearly in workers’ age. 
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Figure 6.The effect of age on the firing thresholds with ( )( )0.5 age 300.2 1.3 1F e− −= + +  and 
( 20age002.01 )−+=w  (firing-only scenario). Ages are equal to (65–T). Other parameters: 
σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, w=1, H = 0.083, and t=0. The bolder lines show the case of 
constant firing costs and wages. 
 
The results show that as the firing costs rise with age and wages remaining constant, 
the firm tends to fire the young first as the young are least protected by the firing costs 
in economic downturns. This reinforces our previous results.13 Moreover, if both 
wages and firing costs are rising in age, the firm would fire the young and/or the old 
first, depending on the actual functional forms of w(age) and F(age) and keep the 
incumbent middle-aged employees. The old are costly to keep (higher wages) and the 
young are less protected by the firing costs than the old.  
                                                 
13 Note that as the F(age) function rarely changes after age 38 and the effect of the firing options hence 
dominate when the firing costs are still relatively small – albeit at a slower increasing rate for the firing 
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 7. Conclusions 
We have provided an explanation for the observed positive relationship between 
youth unemployment and the cost of firing workers. When the cost of firing workers 
is high, firms only fire when the present discounted value of future losses at the firing 
margin is high, in which case they gain little by postponing the firing decision in the 
hope that productivity will recover. The young workers are then the first to go. In 
contrast, when the cost of firing workers is low, the present discounted value of future 
losses is small at the firing margin and firms can choose to wait in the hope of a 
recovery. In this case they may choose to fire the older workers first since the younger 
ones have longer expected tenure and are more likely to be around when productivity 
recovers. In contrast, for all plausible parameter values, firms will choose to hire and 
train the young workers first since they have longer expected tenure and a larger 
firing option. 
It follows, that the effects of employment-protection legislation are likely to depend 
on the age structure of the population. Such legislation is most effective in deterring 
the dismissal of mature workers and, as a result, is more likely to lead firms to dismiss 
the younger ones. The effect arises for the sole reason that the value of the firing 
option is decreasing in both the level of firing costs and in the age of the worker. 
Furthermore, this effect is reinforced when older workers are more likely to quit due 
to higher expected benefits in a defined-benefit pension schemes or the accumulation 
of savings in a defined-contribution scheme. Intuitively, firing the young increases the 
value of the firm by more than firing the old – it is a better investment – because it is 
less likely that they would have left the firm on their own accord. Rising age-firing 
                                                                                                                                            
thresholds when compared with the one in the case of a constant F=0.2 and wage =1. Thus, the firm 
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costs profiles also make firms fire the younger workers first, while rising age-wage 
profiles have the opposite effect of making firms fire the older workers first since they 
are more costly.
                                                                                                                                            
tends to fire the old before the middle-age workers when F depends on age and w is constant. 
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Appendix A: 
As workers live forever (T=∞), equation (8) in the text is reduced to 
( ) YYYY vYYvv 222
1 σηλρ +=+ .                                      (A1) 
(A1) is a homogenous equidimensional linear differential equation and is easily 
solvable. The solutions to (A1) are: 
21
210
ββ YAYAv += ,                                               (A2) 
where A1 and A2 are coefficients and β1 and β2 are the roots of the following 
characteristic equation,  
( ) ( ) 01
2
1 2 =+−+− λρβηββσ Y ,                                   (A3) 
and β1 is positive and β2 is negative, 
( ) 02
2
1
2
1
2
2
221 >++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= σ
λρ
σ
η
σ
ηβ YY ,                        (A4) 
( ) 02
2
1
2
1
2
2
222 <++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−= σ
λρ
σ
η
σ
ηβ YY .                        (A5) 
The hiring and firing solutions for  are 0v
1
1
βYAvH =  for hiring option,                                   (A6) 
2
2
βYAvF =  for firing option.                                   (A7) 
These are equations (10.1) and (10.2) in the text respectively. 
 
 
Appendix B: 
Derivation of Equations (12.1) and (12.2) 
 
We know that if workers are expected to have infinite lives, the hiring and firing 
options approach  and  respectively. Thus, the first guess for the 
solutions to equation (8) in the text would be 
1
1
βYA 22
βYA
( ) ( )tYzYtYvG ,, β= .                                              (B1) 
Differentiating (B1) gives 
Y
G
Y zYzYv
βββ += −1 , 
( ) YYYGYY zYzYzYv βββ βββ ++−= −− 12 21 , 
t
G
t zYv
β= . 
Substituting into equation (8) in the text gives 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 021
2
1 22 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+++++− βλρβηβββσ YzzYzzzYYzz tYYYYY  
or  
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 021
2
1 22 =+−+++++− zzYzzzYYzz tYYYYY λρβηβββσ . 
Rearranging gives 
 28
( ) ( ) 022
2
11
2
1
22
222 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+− tYYYYY zYzzYz σσ
ηβσλρβηββσ .  (B2) 
The first terms in the first bracket are equal to zero automatically due to the 
characteristic equation of equation (A3) in Appendix A. With the assumption that the 
solutions of options have the same components as the ones with infinite maturity, βY , 
the functions, , then follow a Convection-Diffusion type partial differential 
equation:  
( tYz , )
022 22
2 =+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++ tYYYY zYzzY σσ
ηβ .                                 (B3) 
It is time to get rid of the Y and Y2 terms. Let  
,yeY =      − ∞ < < ∞y , ,
2
1
2
1 22 τσσ −= Tt  
where T is a constant. Then we have 
,Yy Yzz =   and ,2 YYYyy YzzYz += .2
1 2
tzz −=τσ  
Substituting into (B3) gives 
0
2
12 2 =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++ τσ
ηβ zzz yYyy .                                   (B4)  
The boundary and conditions for options, equations (9.1) and (9.2) in the text become ( ) 0, =∞− τz , for hiring options,                                   (B5.1) 
( ) 0, =∞ τz , for firing options.                                    (B5.2) 
Substituting the values of betas, 21  and ββ , of equations (A4) and (A5) in Appendix 
A into (B4) gives 
02 =−+ τα zzz yyy , for hiring options,                             (B6)  
02 =−− τα zzz yyy , for firing options,                             (B7)  
where ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λρ
σ
ηα ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= Y .  
 
Hiring options 
We can simplify (B6) by setting 
τα2+= yx , τ=τ . 
Note that τ  is the same as τ . To rewrite (B6) in terms of ( )τ,x  we use the chain rule 
τττττ ατ zzzxzz xx +=+= 2 , 
xyxy zxzz == , and xxyy zz = . 
Substituting into (B6) gives 
τzzxx = .                                                        (B8) 
 A new variable that depends only on x and τ  is often used to solve the above 
partial differential equation: 
τξ
x= ,                                                        (B9) 
so that ( ) ( )ξτ uxz =, . Differentiating shows that  
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( )ξξττ '2
1 uz −= , ( )ξτ ''
1 uzxx = . 
Substituting into equation (B8) gives the following second-order ordinary differential 
equation: 
( ) 0'
2
1'' =+ uu ξξ ,  ∞<<∞− ξ ,                                  (B10) 
The boundary condition of (B5.1) becomes the following equation: ( ) 0=∞−u , for hiring options,                                   (B11) 
 Separating the variables, (B10) becomes 
( ) 41 2' ξξ −= eBu , 
where  is unknown constant.  Integrating gives 1B
( ) 141 2 CdseBu s += ∫
∞−
−
ξ
ξ ,                                         (B12) 
where  is an unknown constant. Applying the boundary condition for hiring options 
(B11) gives 
1C
( ) 0lim 1 ==−∞→ Cu ξξ . 
Substituting into (B12) gives  
( ) ∫
∞−
−=
ξ
ξ dseBu s 41 2 . 
It is convenient to make the change of variable s = 2ϖ , so that  
( ) ∫∫
∞−
−
∞−
− ==
2
2
1
2
2
1
22
2
12
ξ
ϖ
ξ
ϖ ϖπϖξ deAdeBu .                     (B13) 
where π= 211 BA . Substituting (B13) into (B1) and using the facts of  ,yeY =
( ) ( )ξτ uxz =, , τξ
x= , ,
2
1
2
1 22 τσσ −= Tt  τα2+= yx , and ττ =  gives the 
hiring options vH
G , 
( ) ( )11 1, dNYAtYvGH β= ,                                         (B14) 
where 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+
= σ
σ
λρ
σ
ησ 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1ln
 and ( ) ,
2
1 22∫
∞−
−=
d
dedN ϖπ
ϖ . 
 
Firing options 
In a similar way, we can obtain the firing options. We can simplify (B7) by setting 
τα2−= yx  and τ=τ .  
τzzxx = .                                                      (B15) 
A new variable τξ
x=  is used to solve the above partial differential equation so that 
( ) ( )ξτ uxz =, .  Differentiating and substituting into (B15) gives the following simple 
second order ordinary differential equation: 
( ) 0'
2
1'' =+ uu ξξ ,   ∞<<∞− ξ . 
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 Separating the variables, the above equation becomes 
( ) 42 2' ξξ −= eBu , 
where  is unknown constant. Integrating gives 2B
( ) 242 2 AdseBu s += ∫
∞−
−
ξ
ξ ,                                          (B16) 
where  is an unknown constant. The boundary condition of (B5.2) becomes the 
following equation: 
2A
( ) 0=∞u ,     for firing options,                                     (B17) 
Applying the boundary condition for hiring options (B16) gives 
( ) ππξξ 202lim 2222
ABABu −=⇒=+=∞→ . 
Substituting the above relationship back into (C16) gives  
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= ∫
∞−
−
ξ
πξ dseAu
s 4
2
2
2
11 . 
It is convenient to make the change of variable s = 2ϖ , so that  
( ) ∫∫∫
−
∞−
−
∞
−
∞−
− ==⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
222
2
1
2
1
2
11
ξ
ϖ
ξ
ϖ
ξ
ϖ ϖπϖπϖπξ deAdeAdeAu . 
Thus, the firing options vH
G  becomes 
( ) ( )22 2, dNYAtYvGF −= β ,                                      (B18) 
where 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−
= σ
σ
λρ
σ
ησ 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1ln
 and ( ) .
2
1 22∫
∞−
−=
d
dedN ϖπ
ϖ . 
 
Appendix C:  
Derivation of Equations for YvG ∂∂  
 
Differentiating hiring and firing options – defined by (12.1) and (12.2) – with respect 
to Y gives 
( ) ( )111111 11 dNYAdNYAY
v
Y
G
H βββ +=∂
∂ − ,                                  (C1) 
( ) ( 222122 22 dNYAdNYAY
v
Y
G
F −+−=∂
∂ − βββ ) .                             (C2) 
Differentiation of the integral, N(d), involves a parameter. Such differentiation can be 
obtained by using Leibnitz’s rule. Suppose a function  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
∫=
xb
xa
dssxfx ,ϕ ,                                               (C3) 
where f is such that the integration cannot be effected analytically. Using calculus 
gives 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) (xaxaxfxbxbxfds
x
sxfx xx
xb
xa
x ,,
, −+= ∫ ∂∂ϕ ) .                 (C4) 
Applying (C4) to the differentiation of ( )1dN and ( )2dN −  gives 
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y −=
−
−+−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
1 ,                                            (C5) 
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y −−=−
−
−+−−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
2 .                                       (C6) 
where ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λρ
σ
ηα ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= Y . 
 
Appendix D: 
 
Equation (8) in the text can be solved numerically by finite different method. To 
compare the numerical results of finite different method with the analytical solutions 
in the Appendix B, we use the simple and robust explicit finite difference method, 
which is widely used in the pricing of derivatives. 
 For firing options with maturity T, the boundary condition is  and 
, where a = 
( ) 0, =∞ tvG
( ) ( )[ 0,max,0 FbwaYtvG −−−= ] ( )( )( ) ( )YtTYe ηλρηλρ −+− −−+−1 , 
( )( )( ) ( )λρλρ +−= −+− tTeb 1 , and F the firing costs. The terminal condition is 
. The condition of ( ) 0, =TYf ( ) ( )[ ]GG vFbwaYtYv ,max, −−−=  is checked for 
every t since it is a free-boundary condition in a sense that the firing option can be 
exercised at any time. 
 Equation (8) in the text, 
( ) GtGYYGYYG vvYYvv +σ+η=λ+ρ 222
1 ,                                (D1) 
can be approximated by the following grids.14 Let ( ) jiG vYtv ,, ≡ , 
Y
vv
Y
v jijiG
Δ
−=∂
∂ −+++
2
1,11,1  
2
,11,11,1
2
2 2
Y
vvv
Y
v jijijiG
Δ
−+=∂
∂ +−+++  
t
vv
t
v jijiG
Δ
−=∂
∂ + ,,1  
Substituting into (D1) gives 
                                                 
14 For a similar algorithm in derivative pricing, see Brennan and Schwartz (1978). 
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( ) jijijiji
jiji
Y
jiji
v
Y
vvv
Sj
Y
vv
Yj
t
vv
,2
,11,11,1222
1,11,1,,1
2
2
1                    
2
λρσ
η
+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Δ
−+Δ+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Δ
−Δ+Δ
−
+−+++
−++++
           (D2) 
Rearranging gives 
1,1
*
,1
*
1,1
*
, +++−+ ++= jijjijjijji vcvbvav                                    (D3) 
where  
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+Δ−Δ++= tjtjta Yj
22*
2
1
2
1
1
1 σηλρ  
( ) ( )tjtb j Δ−Δ++= 22* 11 1 σλρ  
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Δ+ΔΔ++= tjtjtc Yj
22*
2
1
2
1
1
1 σηλρ  
The firing thresholds calculated from above algorithm are shown in figure D1, 
together with the ones in figure 1. The results show that the analytical solutions are 
good approximations to the real thresholds. 
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Figure D1. The comparison of explicit finite difference 
method and numerical approximations. All parameters are the 
same as in figure 1 in the text.  
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Appendix E: 
 
We consider the alternative to having firing costs rise less steeply as the worker 
sages by redrawing Figure 6 redrawn for the case of firing costs rising linearly in 
workers’ age:  .                                  (0.2 0.025 20F age= + − )
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Figure 6.The effect of age on the firing thresholds with ( )( )30age5.018.02.0 −−++= eF  and 
( 20age002.01 )−+=w  (firing-only scenario). Ages are equal to (65–T). Other parameters: 
σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, w=1, H = 0.083, and t=0. The bolder lines show the case of 
constant firing costs and wages. 
 
The results are qualitatively unchanged so that the firm will fire the younger workers 
first when firing costs are rising in age. Moreover, if both wages and firing costs are 
rising in age, the firm would fire the young and/or the old first, depending on the 
steepness of w(age) and F(age) and keep the incumbent middle-aged employees. The 
old are costly to keep (higher wages) and the young are not protected by the firing 
costs as the old. 
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